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STONERIDGE INVESTMENT PARTNERS V. SCIENTIFIC-
ATLANTA: RETHINKING THE FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET
PRESUMPTION AND THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
PERMEATING THE COURT'S DECISION
INTRODUCTION
Recent corporate scandals have led many Americans to demand ac-
countability for fraud in the securities markets.! After losing billions in
the wake of the Enron and Worldcom scandals, investors started ques-
tioning the integrity of the securities in which they invested.2 This, how-
ever, was not the first time American investors and policy makers enter-
tained concerns over, the safety of the securities markets.3 Outraged by
corporate deception and unfair trade practices in the early 1930s, Con-
gress enacted § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to ensure
effective punishment of fraudulent practices in the securities markets.4
For over fifty years, the Supreme Court's decisions reflected that, under
§ 10(b), fraud would not be tolerated.5 Recently, however, the Court has
made it increasingly difficult for injured investors to maintain § 10(b)
claims against persons defrauding the market.6
Part I of this Comment explains pertinent case law, economic the-
ory, and legislation prior to Stoneridge. Part II summarizes the holding
in Stoneridge. Part III analyzes Stoneridge, criticizes the Court's hold-
ing, and provides suggestions for a more appropriate rule. This Com-
ment concludes that the recent holding in Stoneridge unnecessarily raises
the hurdle for primary actor liability by further limiting the fraud-on-the-
market presumption of reliance in contravention of the economic princi-
ples supporting that presumption. In the end, the Court's decision is a
reflection of pro-business policy considerations that degrade the integrity
of U.S. securities markets.
1. See Celia R. Taylor, Breaking the Bank: Reconsidering Central Bank of Denver After
Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley, 71 Mo. L. REv. 367, 384 (2006).
2. See id. at 375, 384.
3. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 779-80
(2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
4. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (current version at 15
U.S.C.A. § 780) (West 2008)); see also Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
511 U.S. 164, 195 (1994).
5. See Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 192-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
6. See id.; see also Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 768.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934 and Rule 1Ob-5
In response to public outcry following manipulative trading prac-
tices leading up to the Great Depression, Congress enacted § 10(b) mak-
ing it:
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange...
[T]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.7
With the express authority of Congress as embodied in § 10(b), the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) propounded Rule 10b-5 to
combat fraudulent activities in the markets by making it unlawful:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which op-
erates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security.8
Not surprisingly, the intent of Congress in enacting § 10(b) was to
promote honest securities markets and rebuild investor confidence after
the stock market crash of 1929. 9 Congress designed the broad scope of §
10(b)'s language as a "catchall" provision to prevent fraudulent activities
in securities markets.1° Moreover, the purpose of the 1934 Act was to
ensure fairness in the impersonal securities markets where, traditionally,
common-law remedies had failed defrauded investors. 1 In sum, Con-
gress enacted § 10(b) to preserve fairness and integrity in America's se-
curities markets.'
2
7. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(j) (West 2008).
8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2008). Rule lOb-5 is the SEC's implementation of § 10(b). See
United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997). Accordingly, for purposes of this Comment,
use of the term "a § 10(b) claim" refers to both the statutory provision and the SEC Rule lOb-5.
9. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658.
10. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 246 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 248.




1. The Elements of a § 10(b) Claim
During eighty years of jurisprudence, the Court has established that
to maintain a claim under § 10(b), a plaintiff must generally prove: (1) a
material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter; 13 (3) a connection
with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance; (5) economic loss;
and (6) loss causation.' 4 The Court, however, noted that deceptive con-
duct 5 could also satisfy the first element.'
6
B. Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York v. Bankers Life
and Casualty Company
17
In Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York v. Bankers
Life and Casualty Company, the Supreme Court recognized that § 10(b)
carried an implied right of action for private plaintiffs. 8 In Bankers Life,
respondent Bankers Life agreed to sell all of the stock of Manhattan
Casualty Company to a third party for $5,000,000.19 However, the buyer
conspired to pay for the stock using Manhattan's own assets.20 Manhat-
tan investors were deceived into believing that the assets were being used
to fund the purchase of government bonds.2' Importantly, the statutory
text of § 10(b) does not explicitly confer the fight for private parties to
maintain suits. 22  Yet, the Court interpreted § 10(b)'s broad remedial
language to implicitly confer a private right of action.23 Thereafter, de-
frauded investors had a powerful remedy under § 10(b) to disgorge per-
sons engaging in securities fraud of their ill-gotten gains.
C. Chiaralla v. United States
2 4
In Chiaralla v. United States, the Court expanded upon the rule that
a misrepresentation stemming from nondisclosure of material informa-
tion under Rule 1Ob-5 is not actionable unless the actor had a duty to
13. Scienter, to put it succinctly, is a wrongful state of mind. See Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193, 197 (1976).
14. Dura Pharms, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005).
15. "Deceptive act" is an ever-changing term. Prior to Stoneridge, the prevailing definition
included only a misrepresentation or an omission by one with a duty to disclose. See infra notes 81-
83. In Stoneridge, however, the Court recognized that a "deceptive act" included not just misrepre-
sentations and omissions, but other unspecified "deceptive conduct." See Stoneridge Inv. Partners,
L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761,769-70 (2008).
16. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769 (holding that it was erroneous for the circuit court to
conclude that only misstatements or omissions by one with a duty to disclose are deceptive under §
10(b). The Court noted that a deceptive act does not require a specific written or oral statement for
liability to attach).
17. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
18. Id. at 13 n.9.
19. Id. at7.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 8-9.
22. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 780) (West 2008) (conferring power only to the SEC to promulgate
appropriate regulation).
23. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 12-13, 13 n.9.
24. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
2008]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
disclose the information to investors. In Chiaralla, the defendant
worked for a financial printer that frequently handled corporate takeover
bids.26 The defendant would decipher insider information regarding
takeovers and subsequently buy stock in those companies.27  When the
information was released to the public, the defendant sold his shares and
made a significant profit.28 The crux of the case concerned whether a
defendant's silence could be considered a manipulative or deceptive de-
vice under § 10(b). 29 Using corporate insider trading and fiduciary rela-
tionships as its guide, the Court concluded that § 10(b) liability does not
attach to a defendant's silence in the absence of a duty to disclose the
information stemming from a position of trust.
30
D. The "Efficient Market" Theory
The efficient market theory is an economic hypothesis relied upon
31 32by the Court, 1 as well as lower federal courts, and is the backbone of
the fraud-on-the-market presumption.33 In short, the theory proposes that
well-developed markets are "informationally efficient., 34 In particular,
the theory holds that within well-developed impersonal trading markets
any public information regarding a particular security is quickly seized
upon by investors and therefore reflected in the market price.35 For ex-
ample, misinformation about a company's increased earnings that
reaches the efficient market will very quickly be acted upon by investors.
In light of the earnings information, some investors will buy or sell the
stock of that company. The buying and selling, based in part upon the
misinformation about earnings, will lead to an increase in trading activity
and therefore an increase or decrease in the stock's price. In sum, the
efficient market theory holds that in well-developed markets, all public
information, good or bad, is reflected in a security's market price.36
25. Id. at 228.
26. Id. at 224.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 226.
30. Id. at 235.
31. See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248-49 (1987) (applying the efficient
market theory).
32. See, e.g., In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig. v. PolyMedica Corp., 432 F.3d 1, 14-17 (1st
Cir. 2005) (applying the efficient market theory).
33. See William 0. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in a Time of
Madness?, 54 EMORY L.J. 843, 847-49 (2005).
34. See In re PolyMedica, 432 F.3d at 14-17.
35. See Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value,
and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1240-41 (1990).
36. See Roger J. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A Recipe for the
Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 374-81 (1984); see also Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital
Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970); see also In re LTV Sec.
Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 142-47 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (providing detailed descriptions of the history of the
efficient market hypothesis and its application to the fraud-on-the-market presumption).
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There are actually three distinct forms of the efficient market the-
ory: the weak form, the semi-strong form, and the strong form.3 7 The
weak form simply states that past information has no bearing on a secu-
rity's future market price.38 The weak form is largely ignored by the
courts.39 In contrast, the strong form dictates that both public and private
information is already reflected in a security's market price.40 Similar to
the weak form, the strong theory has also been uniformly rejected by the
courts.4  However, the semi-strong form states that a security's market
price reflects all public information.42 It is the semi-strong form that has
been generally accepted by the courts and forms the basis for the fraud-
on-the-market presumption of reliance.43
Eventually, the efficient market theory was used to support the
"random walk" investing theory which states that markets are so efficient
it is impossible for any investor to "beat" the market using information
that is available to the rest of the investing public.44 The basis of the
random walk theory is that any public information an investor obtained
would already be reflected in the market price thereby offsetting that
investor's ability to use the information to his tactical advantage.45
To be sure, the efficient market theory has come under fire for some
of its limitations.46  In general, however, the concept that all public in-
formation has the ability to influence a security's market price is fairly
well accepted.47
E. Basic Incorporated v. Levinson
48
In Basic Incorporated v. Levinson, the Court established the stan-
dard that a plaintiff (or class of plaintiffs) can satisfy the reliance re-
37. See Nathaniel Carden, Implications of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 for Judicial Presumptions of Market Efficiency, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 883-41 (explaining
three forms of the efficient market theory).





43. See id. at 883-84. As the courts have generally adopted the semi-strong form of the effi-
cient market theory, use of the term "the efficient market theory" within this Comment refers to the
semi-strong form.
44. See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 100 (W.W. Norton &
Company Inc. 2007) (1973) (providing brief overview of the random walk theory and the efficiency
of capital markets).
45. See id.
46. See Frederick C. Dunbar and Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral Fi-
nance, 31 DEL J. CORP. L. 455, 531 (2006) (concluding that the efficient market is not efficient
during market bubbles); see also Note, Securities law-Fraud-on-the-Market-First Circuit Defines
An Efficient Market for Fraud-On-The-Market Purposes.-In re Polymedica Corp. Securities Litiga-
tion, 432 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005), 119 HARV. L. REV. 2284, 2289-90 (2006) (stating that an efficient
market may respond to all information, but it does not respond to all information with an equal effect
on market price).
47. See Carden, supra note 37, at 883-84.
48. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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quirement of § 10(b) by virtue of a defendant's "fraud on the market." 49
In that case, petitioner Basic, Inc., entertained offers to merge but con-
currently issued three public announcements stating that it was not con-
50sidering a merger. Plaintiffs as a class alleged that they sold their stock
after Basic, Inc., made its first denial and that Basic, Inc.'s misrepresen-
tations regarding the merger artificially depressed the value of the com-
pany's stock.51 Because plaintiffs were a class, determining each indi-
vidual's reliance on Basic, Inc.'s statements would overwhelm the com-
-52mon elements of the case.
To remedy this problem, the Court fashioned the fraud-on-the-
market rebuttable presumption of reliance, which is based in large part
on the economic principles and scholarship surrounding the efficient
market theory.53 In creating the presumption, the Court reasoned that in
modem impersonal securities markets, the market itself performs a
valuation function by transmitting information regarding the market price
of a security.54 The Court adopted the views of the Third Circuit's opin-
ion in Peil v. Speiser,55 by reciting that:
The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an
open and developed securities market, the price of a company's stock
is determined by the available material information regarding the
company and its business .... Misleading statements will therefore
defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely
on the misstatements .... The causal connection between the defen-
dants' fraud and the plaintiffs' purchase of stock in such a case is no
less significant than in a case of direct reliance on misrepresenta-
tions.
56
In Basic, the Court established that purchasers of stock rely on the
integrity of the price of a stock as a reflection of its value.57 In reaching
this position, the Court noted that a significant body of empirical data
suggested that market prices are affected by all available public informa-
tion.58 Accordingly, public misstatements are necessarily reflected in a
security's market price.59 Since no person would "knowingly roll the dice
49. Id. at 247.
50. Id. at 227.
51. Id. at 228.
52. Id. at 242.
53. Id. at 241-49.
54. Id. at 244.
55. 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986).
56. Basic, 485 U.S. at 244 (quoting Peil, 806 F.2d at 1161).
57. Id. at 242.
58. Id. at 246 (stating that empirical evidence supports that the market price of shares traded





in a crooked crap game," the Court held that all purchasers of securities
rely on the integrity of the market.6°
To invoke the presumption, the Court adopted the same test applied
by the circuit court in that case: (1) the defendant made public misrepre-
sentations; (2) the misrepresentations were material; (3) the securities
were traded in an efficient market; (4) the misrepresentations would lead
a reasonable investor to misinterpret the value of the securities; and (5)
the securities were traded in the time period between when the defendant
made the misrepresentations and when the truth was revealed to the pub-
lic.61 The Court also noted that the second and fourth elements could
collapse into a single element.62
However, the Court expressly stated that the presumption of § 10(b)
reliance under the fraud-on-the-market theory was rebuttable.63 In an
abundance of caution, the Court warned that "any showing that severs
the link between the alleged misrepresentation and either the price re-
ceived (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market
price, will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance."
64
F. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver
65
In Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, the
Court overruled more than thirty years of precedent by holding that an
actor's aiding and abetting another's fraudulent conduct was not action-
able under § 10(b).6 6 In 1986, a public building authority issued bonds to
fund a planned residential area.67 The bonds were secured by land owner
assessment liens, which required that the value of the land be at least 160
percent of the bonds.68 The value of the land was to be assessed annu-
ally.69 In 1988, the developer of the land provided an assessment to the
Central Bank of Denver that remained largely unchanged from 1986 de-
spite a significant downturn in the real estate market.70 In response, the
Central Bank of Denver demanded a reassessment of the land, but
worked with the developer to delay the reassessment until after a bond
issue.7 1 Prior to the reassessment but after the bond issue, the public
building authority defaulted on the bonds.72 Purchasers of the bonds
60. Id. at 247 (quoting Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y.
1982)).
61. Id. at 248 n.27.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 248.
64. Id.
65. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
66. Id. at 191.
67. Id. at 167.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 167.
71. Id. at 167-68.
72. Id. at 168.
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brought an action under § 10(b) alleging that the Central Bank of Denver
aided and abetted the Authority's fraudulent conduct by tacitly agreeing
to stay the reassessment until after the bond issue.73
In eliminating aider and abettor liability, the Court once again paid
close attention to the statutory text of § 10(b).74 Importantly, the text of
the statute only prohibits the use or employment of a manipulative or
deceptive act.75 The Court focused on this language and reasoned that an
actor must actually "make" a manipulative or deceptive act in order to be
within the purview of § 10(b).76 In sum, the Court held that an actor does
not "use or employ" a manipulative or deceptive act as proscribed by §
10(b) unless that actor "makes" a manipulative or deceptive act such as a
77material misrepresentation or omission.
Central to its holding, the Court noted that aiders and abettors do
not make statements at all, but rather, facilitate the statements of others.7 8
Accordingly, the Court reasoned that aiding and abetting was not con-
duct prohibited by the text of § 10(b) since aiders and abettors do not use
or employ (make) a manipulative or deceptive act.79 The Court was con-
cerned that, were the rule otherwise, aiding and abetting could extend to
include actors that did not engage in the conduct Congress intended to
proscribe in § 10(b).80 Another rationale to support the Court's holding
was that allowing liability against aiders and abettors circumvented the
reliance requirement of a § 10(b) claim. 81 That is, how can a plaintiff
rely on a misstatement that is never "made" by the defendant?
82
However, the Court was not without reservation and at the end of its
opinion noted that:
The absence of § 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not mean
that secondary actors in the securities markets are always free from
liability under the securities acts. Any person or entity, in including a
lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or
makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or
seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under
lOb-5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under
Rule lOb-5 are met.83
73. Id.
74. Id. at 175.
75. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C.A § 78(j) (West 2008).





81. Id. at 180.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 191.
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In reserving this caveat, the Court made no mention of the language
permeating its opinion beforehand, namely, that an actor must use or
employ a manipulative or deceptive act.84 Instead, the Court held that a
"deceptive act" as mentioned in § 10(b) only includes making a material
misstatement or omission.85 This small textual difference was later
found to be erroneous in Stoneridge,86 but nevertheless greatly reduced
the perceived scope of conduct encompassed by the term "deceptive
act.' 87 Indeed, a normal reading of the above caveat seems to suggest
that the only conduct prohibited by § 10(b) are manipulative acts or ma-
terial misstatements or omissions.88 The text of § 10(b), however,
broadly proscribes deceptive acts, which, as plainly evident, encom-
passes conduct more expansive than merely misstatements and omis-
sions.89 It was not until Stoneridge that the Court acknowledged that a
deceptive act could include deceptive conduct, not just misstatements
and omissions.90
1. Chaos After the Storm: § 10(b) Litigation Following Central
Bank
The Court's opinion in Central Bank caused an upheaval in the se-
curities world.9' Shortly after the Court issued the opinion, Congress
enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 199592 (PSLRA).
PSLRA changed the pleading requirements of § 10(b) actions and
granted the SEC additional authority in prosecuting aiding and abetting
in the securities markets.93 Originally, the proponents of PSLRA sought
a Congressional declaration that aiders and abettors are liable under §
84. Id.
85. See id. The Court relied on Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977) to
conclude that the term "deceptive act" as it is used in § 10(b) only prohibits the making of a material
misstatement or an omission by one with a duty to disclose. This finding, however, was held as
erroneous in Stoneridge. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct.
761, 769 (2008).
86. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769 (stating that it was error for the circuit court to conclude that
only misstatements, omissions by one with a duty to disclose, and manipulative trading are "decep-
tive acts" as proscribed in § 10(b)).
87. Following Central Bank, many lower courts interpreted that the only deceptive acts for
which § 10(b) liability could attach were material misstatements and omissions by persons with a
duty to disclose. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482
F.3d 372, 384 (5th Cir. 2007).
88. See id.
89. 15 U.S.C.A. § 786) (West 2008); see also Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 775 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
90. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769.
91. See Andrew S. Gold, Reassessing the Scope of Conduct Prohibited by Section 10(b) and
the Elements of Rule lOb-5: Reflections on Securities Fraud and Secondary Actors, 53 CATH. U. L.
REV. 667, 667 (2004).
92. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
93. Id.
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10(b). However, in a legislative compromise,94 Congress only extended
a right of action to the SEC.95
In the aftermath, lower courts struggled over the implications of
Central Bank's holding.96 Specifically, while Central Bank required that
an actor "make" a statement in order for liability to attach, it did not de-
fine what actions would suffice for a statement to be considered
"made., 97 As a result, three standards developed in the lower courts. 98
a. The "Bright Line" Test
Jurisdictions subscribing to the bright line test recognize a primary
§ 10(b) violation only if an actor actually makes a material misstatement
attributable to the actor at the time of public dissemination.99 In order for
a misstatement to be attributable to an actor, it must be communicated by
that actor directly to the investing public or the actor must have known or
should have known that the misstatement would reach the public.1' ° Ac-
cording to the bright line rule, an absence of attribution of the deceptive
act to the defendant at the time a plaintiffs investment decision was
made would circumvent the reliance requirements of § 10(b) and the
Court's decision in Central Bank.'0' In sum, the bright line test equated
"making" a misstatement with attribution of the misstatement to the
speaker. 10 2 The justification for the bright line test is aptly described in
In re MTC Electronic Technologies Shareholders Litigation:
[I]f Central Bank is to have any real meaning, a defendant must actu-
ally make a false or misleading statement in order to be held liable
under Section 10(b). Anything short of such conduct is merely aid-
ing and abetting, and no matter how substantial that aid may be, it is
not enough to trigger liability under Section 10(b).1
0 3
Not all courts, however, interpreted Central Bank as requiring attri-
bution of a misstatement to a speaker in order for that speaker to have
used or employed the misstatement.
94. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 778-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. Id.; see also id. at 771.
96. See Cecil C. Kuhne, III, Expanding the Scope of Securities Fraud? The Shifting Sands of
Central Bank, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 25, 33 (2004).
97. See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
98. See Kuhne, supra note 96, at 33 (describing the "bright-line" test and the "participation"
test); see also In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 439 F. Supp. 2d 692, 723 (S.D.
Tex. 2006) (describing the "scheme" test).
99. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston, Inc. (USA), 482 F.3d
372, 385-86 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Gold, supra note 91, at 676-78.
100. See Kuhne, supra note 96, at 34.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 33.
103. In re MTC Elec. Techs. S'holders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 987 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); see also
Kuhne, supra note 96, at 33.
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b. The "Participation" Test
Under the participation test it is not necessary that an actor actually
make a statement (let alone one attributable to him) to be primarily liable
under § 10(b).1 4 Rather, an actor must only substantially participate in
the creation of fraud.105 In effect, the participation test equates creating a
misrepresentation with making a misrepresentation. 106 Under the partici-
pation test, conduct such as involvement in the creation of false docu-
ments, or overstating revenues without public attribution have been held
to be primary § 10(b) violations. 1° 7
c. Hybrid "Scheme" Liability
Litigation stemming from the Enron scandal created a new standard
of liability combining pertinent portions of both the bright line and par-
ticipation tests.108 Under "scheme" liability, an actor can be liable for a
misrepresentation if it was created with the purpose and effect of further-
ing a scheme to defraud. 1° 9 In essence, misrepresentations in furtherance
of a scheme are considered deceptive acts directly prohibited by the text
of § 10(b).11° That is, misrepresentations in furtherance of a scheme to
defraud are primary violations of § 10(b), not aiding and abetting.11 ' The
Supreme Court rejected scheme liability in Stoneridge.
112
II. STONERIDGE INVESTMENT PARTNERS V. SCIENTIFIC-ATL4NTA
1 13
A. Facts
In late 2000, executives from the cable service provider Charter
Communications (Charter) realized Charter's revenue would fall short of
Wall Street's projections to the tune of fifteen to twenty million dol-
lars. '1 4 To cover up the deficit, Charter engaged in a series of deceptive
acts with the suppliers of its cable boxes, Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola
(Respondents). 15 Particularly, Charter entered into sham deals whereby
Charter would overpay a sum of twenty dollars for each cable box and in
return, the box providers would use the overpayment to purchase adver-
104. See Simpson v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 452 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006).
105. See id. at 1048-50.
106. Id. at 1048; see also Kuhne, supra note 96, at 37-42.
107. See Kuhne, supra note 96, at 38-39.
108. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 439 F. Supp. 2d 692, 723 (S.D.
Tex. 2006).
109. See id. at 723-24.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 724.
112. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 770-72
(2008) (finding that deceptive acts of Respondents engaged in with the purpose and effect of de-
frauding investors could not satisfy the reliance and causation elements of a § 10(b) claim absent a
public disclosure).
113. 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
114. Id. at 766.
115. Id.
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tising from Charter.' 16 Charter would then record the advertising as
revenue.11 7 All parties were aware that the agreements had no economic
substance, yet respondents still agreed to the arrangement.'
18
In order to deceive Charter's auditor, respondent Scientific-Atlanta
authored and submitted a false letter to Charter stating that it had in-
creased production costs by twenty dollars per cable box.1 9 Similarly,
respondent Motorola entered into a contract serving no useful business
purpose whereby Charter agreed to purchase a specific number of cable
boxes and would pay liquidated damages to respondent Motorola in the
amount of twenty dollars per cable box that it did not purchase, with the
expectation that Charter would not buy all of the cable boxes and would
have to pay the damages. 12  The monies paid in liquidated damages
would then be used by respondent Motorola to purchase advertising from
Charter. 12 1 The letters and contracts were backdated to appear as sepa-
rate transactions from the purchase of advertising in order to not raise
any suspicions with Charter's auditor. 22 In total, Charter overpaid Re-
spondents seventeen million dollars that was subsequently used to pur-
chase advertising. 23 As known to all involved, Charter reported the sev-
enteen million as revenue on its financial statements filed with the SEC
and disseminated to the investing public. 124
B. Procedural History
When the scheme was uncovered, injured investors brought a class
action lawsuit against Charter and certain of its executives, Charter's
auditor, and Respondents. The class alleged that by engaging in the
fraudulent transactions and affirmatively drafting false backdated docu-
ments, both Respondents were liable under § 10(b) as primary actors.
125
Petitioners Stoneridge Investment Partners, L.L.C. (Petitioners) acted as
the lead plaintiff.126 To prove their claim, Petitioners sought to invoke
"scheme" liability, alleging that Respondents engaged in deceptive con-
duct with the purpose and effect of furthering a scheme to make a mis-
representation to investors.
1 27
The district court granted Respondents' motion to dismiss for fail-












127. Id. at 770.
128. Id. at 767.
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cuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, reasoning that Respondents
did not make misstatements that were relied upon by the class, and there-
fore, primary § 10(b) liability could not attach. 29 In short, the district
and circuit courts ruled that Respondents' conduct did not fit squarely
into the caveat reserved by the Court's holding in Central Bank; that is,
Respondents did not make a misstatement that independently satisfied all
of the elements of § 10(b). Therefore, Respondents were merely aiding
and abetting Charter's deceptive conduct and could not be liable under
the precepts established in Central Bank.
30
C. Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that
Respondents only aided and abetted Charter and therefore could not be
found liable under § 10(b).' 31 The Court reasoned that unless Respon-
dents' conduct satisfied all of the elements of a § 10(b) action, Respon-
dents could not be considered primary actors and would be excluded
from liability under the rule set forth in Central Bank.132 In determining
whether Respondents met each element, the Court acknowledged that the
conduct of Respondents would be considered a "deceptive act" as that
term is used in § 10(b). 133 In doing so, the Court resolved the ambiguity
permeating its earlier decisions and held that a deceptive act included not
only misstatements and omissions, but also deceptive conduct.'
34
Nevertheless, the Court held that the class could not prove the nec-
essary element of reliance. 135 In rejecting Petitioner's fraud-on-the-
market argument, the Court reasoned that Respondents did not make a
public statement to the investing public and Charter's filing with the SEC
did not mention Respondents.' 36 In other words, Respondents' deceptive
conduct was not publicly attributable to Respondents. 137 The Court rea-
soned that Respondents' conduct did not make it "necessary or inevita-
ble" that Charter file the transactions as fraudulent revenue with the
SEC. 13 Ultimately, the majority concluded that the investing public had
no way of knowing, and therefore no way of relying on, Respondents'
deceptive acts.
139
The majority rejected Petitioners' contention that Respondents
should be liable under the hybrid "scheme" liability theory that evolved
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 768.






138. Id. at 770.
139. Id. at 769.
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during the Enron cases after Central Bank.140 Specifically, Petitioners
asserted, "in an efficient market investors rely not only upon the public
statements relating to a security but also upon the transactions those
statements reflect., 41  Therefore, Petitioners argued that since Respon-
dents engaged in deceptive conduct with the purpose and effect of de-
frauding Charter's investors, Respondents were liable as primary viola-
tors of § 10(b) under the "scheme" liability framework.142 The majority,
however, noted that the elements of reliance and causation under the
"scheme" theory were too remote for liability to attach. 143 On this point,
the Court felt that it would be too tenuous to find that Petitioners relied
upon Respondents' deceptive acts when those acts were not directly
communicated to the market by Respondents and Petitioners had no way
of attributing the acts to Respondents."4
The Court reasoned that Petitioners' theory would extend liability
beyond the realm of the securities markets (and therefore § 10(b)) and
into the realm of day-to-day business. 45 Costs associated with being a
publicly traded company would increase and foreign companies would
be deterred from entering America's securities markets. 46 Expanding
the scope of liability, according to the majority, was not within the statu-
tory language of § 10(b) or the power of the Court.
147
To buttress its holding, the majority relied on Congress' enactment
of the PSLRA after Central Bank.1 48 Importantly, when enacting the
PSLRA, Congress entertained the notion of extending aiding and abet-
ting liability to private citizens under § 10(b) but it ultimately chose not
to do So.149 The majority stated:
And in accord with the nature of the cause of action at issue here, we
give weight to Congress' amendment to the Act restoring aiding and
abetting liability in certain cases but not others. The amendment, in
our view, supports the conclusion that there is no liability.1
50




144. Id. at 769.
145. Id. at 770.
146. Id. at 772.
147. Id. at 771.
148. Id.
149. Id. In fact, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt suggested extending a private right of action in
his testimony and report to Congress. See Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Federal Securi-
ties Laws: Hearings on the Impact of the Supreme Court's Decision in Central Bank Before the
Subcomm. on Securities Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the S., 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1994), available at 1994 WL 233142; see also Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 768-69 (citing S.
Hearing No. 103-759, at 13-14) (1994)).




Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, dissented
based on their view that Respondents' fraud was itself a deceptive act
satisfying all of the elements for § 10(b) liability. 5  That is, Respon-
dents conduct was a primary violation of the statute and therefore
amounted to more than aiding and abetting. 52 The dissent argued that
Stoneridge was distinguishable from Central Bank because the Respon-
dents in that case did not actually commit a deceptive act.1 53 The dissent
believed the majority's view encompassed an overly broad interpretation
of Central Bank and imposed an inappropriate "super causation" view of
reliance unsupported by authority. 54 Specifically, the dissent stated that
reliance is not meant to be a difficult hurdle to cross, but traditionally has
only required transaction causation. 55 To prove transaction causation, a
plaintiff need only show that "but for" the deceptive act, he or she would
not have purchased or sold securities. 156 Further, the dissent asserted that
the rebuttable presumption of reliance under the fraud-on-the-market
theory was created precisely for this type of situation, where investors
cannot prove that they relied on the defendant's misrepresentations, but
instead relied on the market and were thereafter defrauded.1
5 7
The dissent noted that Petitioners' theory of liability would not ex-
tend to the entire market but only to those persons and entities engaging
in fraudulent conduct. 58 In closing, the dissent commented that the 1934




A. Rethinking the Scope of the Fraud-on-the-Market Presumption of
Reliance: The Court Should have Expanded the Applicability of the
Presumption when it Held that a "Deceptive Act" Included More than
Just Statements and Omissions
In Stoneridge, the Court held that Petitioners could not use the
fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance because Respondents did
not make a public misrepresentation as required by Basic.t6° Unable to
prove reliance, Petitioners could not satisfy all of the elements of a §
151. Id. at 774 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 774-75.
155. Id. at 775.
156. Id. at 776 (citing Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 172 (2d Cir. 2005);
Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1065-66, (9th Cir. 1999)).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 779.
159. Id. at 779-82.
160. Id. at 769-70 (finding that Respondents' deceptive acts were not communicated to the
public and therefore the public did not have any knowledge of those acts).
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10(b) claim and could therefore only be considered aiders and abettors
based on the rule set forth in Central Bank.161 The Court, however, ap-
plied the elements of the fraud-on-the-market presumption without con-
sidering that, at the time Basic was decided, and indeed, from the Santa
Fe decision in 1977 until Stoneridge in 2008, the prevailing rule of law
was that a deceptive act only included misrepresentations or omissions
by one with a duty to disclose. 62 When the Stoneridge Court overturned
this precedent by acknowledging that a deceptive act could include con-
duct other than a misrepresentation or omission, 16 3 it should have also
considered how this expansion would affect the fraud-on-the-market
presumption.
1. Reliance Under the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory Should Not be
Limited Solely to a Defendant that Makes a "Public Misrepre-
sentation," but Should Apply to Any Defendant Engaging in a
Deceptive Act the Substance of which Becomes Public
The economic principles permeating the fraud-on-the-market theory
are equally applicable to information contained in a public misrepresen-
tation as to information contained in a nonpublic deceptive act that is
later disseminated to the public. 164 Accordingly, although Basic requires
that the defendant make a public misrepresentation,1 65 the precepts of the
efficient market theory underlying Basic's holding dictate that any mate-
rial information that becomes public will influence a security's market
price in the same manner as a direct public misrepresentation. 166 In the
wake of Stoneridge, it has become clear that the Court needs to recon-
sider whether the fraud-on-the-market presumption applies to deceptive
acts other than misstatements. This Comment proposes that, even though
Basic requires that a defendant speak a misrepresentation to the market,
that rule was created when a deceptive act only included misstatements
161. See id.
162. See id. In Santa Fe, the Court inferred that an act is not "deceptive," as that term is used
in § 10(b), absent a misstatement or an omission by one with a duty to disclose. See Santa Fe Indus.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977). The Court affirmed this rule in Central Bank. See Cent.
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994). Generally, in the
thirty-one years between Santa Fe and Stoneridge, the prevailing rule among lower courts reflected
that a deceptive act only included misstatements and omissions. See Fidel v. Farley, 392 F.3d 220,
235 (6th Cir. 2004); accord Ziemba v. Cascade Int'l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1204-06 (11 th Cir. 2001);
Wright v. Ernst & Young L.L.P., 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod.
Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1225-27 (10th Cir. 1996); In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d
615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Dynegy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 339 F. Supp. 2d 804, 914-16 (S.D. Tex.
2004); In re Homestore.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1040-41 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
Indeed, even the Eighth Circuit applied that test in the lower proceedings of Stoneridge. In re Char-
ter Commc'ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cir. 2006).
163. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769.
164. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244-48 (1987) (stating that empirical studies
have shown that a security's market price is a composite of all available public information, and
therefore, all public misrepresentations); see also supra Part I.D.
165. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 247.
166. See supra Part I.D.
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or omissions by persons with a duty to disclose. 167 As an omission in-
herently cannot be spoken, the Basic rule was designed to apply solely to
misrepresentations. 168
In Stoneridge, when the Court expanded the scope of conduct
amounting to a deceptive act proscribed by § 10(b) it should have recon-
sidered the applicability of the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reli-
ance to deceptive acts other than just misrepresentations instead of de-
termining that the presumption was inapplicable. Notably, the same re-
sult is achieved upon a security's market price whether a defendant
makes a public misrepresentation or whether that defendant, like in Ston-
eridge, commits a deceptive act in secrecy and the substance of that act
later reaches the public through other means. 169  Misinformation that
becomes public is not less fraudulent, and does not abstain from influ-
encing a security's market price, simply because the defendant does not
communicate it directly to the market. 1
70
As the Court noted in Basic, the fraud-on-the-market theory is
premised on the notion that investors rely on the market price when pur-
chasing or selling a security and that price is affected by all available
public information.' 7' Importantly, the efficient market theory notes that
after information becomes public, it is reflected in the market price.
172
At that point, if the information is false, investors have been defrauded
because the market price they are relying upon is not genuine. 73 Surely,
if fraudulent information becomes public and is reflected in the market
price, then under the efficient market theory it is of little consequence
how that information came to the public eye.
Thus, on one hand, the Court in Basic noted that all public informa-
tion is reflected in a security's price,174 but on the other hand, the Court
only allowed the presumption to apply if the defendant made a public
misrepresentation. 75 One possible explanation for this inconsistency is
that when Basic was decided a misrepresentation was the only type of
"deceptive act" proscribed by § 10(b) that could be communicated to the
167. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 776 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. See supra Part I.E.
169. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 243-47; see also supra Part I.D. If the efficient market theory and
the Court's reasoning in Basic hold that a security's market price is affected by all public informa-
tion, then that market price has the potential to be affected by any form of information that reaches
the public. In this sense, the market price does not distinguish between a public misrepresentation,
or a misrepresentation or other deceptive act that is not directly communicated to the public but
becomes public at a later date through any means.
170. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-47; see also supra Part I.D.
171. Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-47.
172. Id.; supra Part I.D.
173. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-47; see also supra Part I.D.
174. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 244-48.
175. Id. at 248.
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public.1 76 Thus, the Basic court had no occasion to consider whether the
fraud-on-the-market presumption could apply to other forms of conduct
or communication. 77 As a result, when the Stoneridge court acknowl-
edged at the outset of its decision that a "deceptive act" encompassed
more than just misrepresentations and omissions, it should not have
summarily dismissed the applicability of the fraud-on-the-market pre-
sumption of reliance because Respondents had not made a "public mis-
representation. ' 78 Had the Court considered how expanding the scope
of prohibited deceptive acts would affect the fraud-on-the-market pre-
sumption, it would have also had to address that the rationale supporting
the fraud-on-the-market presumption does not distinguish between in-
formation that is directly communicated to the public or arrives there via
some other means. 179  To an efficient market, information is informa-
tion-regardless of its source.18
0
In determining that the fraud-on-the-market presumption did not
apply, the Court found it fatal that "no member of the investing public
had knowledge, either actual or presumed, of Respondents' deceptive
acts."' 18 1 The Court relied on Basic for this assertion. 182 However, af-
firmative knowledge of the defendant's acts appears nowhere in Basic
and runs contrary to the rationale permeating that decision.' 83 Rather, the
efficient market theory and the Court's rationale for the fraud-on-the-
market presumption in Basic speak about how information influences the
price of a security when it infiltrates the market. 184 It is the mere pres-
ence of that information, not the identity of the person supplying that
information, that affects a security's market price. 85 Moreover, it is the
plaintiffs reliance on the integrity of that price, as opposed to the iden-
tity and nature of defendant's actions, that forms the basis for the fraud-
on-the-market presumption.1 86 If anything, Basic holds that a plaintiff
using the fraud-on-the-market presumption does not need to have knowl-
edge of the defendant's deceptive acts so long as those acts somehow
become public and influence the market price of a security.
87
176. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 776 (2008)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. Compare Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-77 (1977) (establishing that the
term "deceptive conduct" only includes misstatements and omissions by one with a duty to disclose),
with Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 (holding that the fraud-on-the-market theory only applies to public
misrepresentations). See also Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 776 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769.
179. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-47; see also supra Part I.D.
180. See supra Part I.D.
181. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769.
182. See id.
183. See Basic, 485 U.S. 224.
184. See id. at 241-47; see also supra Part I.D.
185. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 246-47; see also supra Part I.D.
186. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 246-47 (holding that traders of securities in well-developed markets
rely on the integrity a security's market price).
187. See id. at 244-49; see also Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 776 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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However, the Court reasoned in Stoneridge that knowledge of the
Respondents' deceptive acts, by means of attribution of the acts to the
Respondents in a public statement, served a vital causation function.1
88
Without a clear public statement, the Court felt that it was impossible for
the Petitioners to rely on the "Respondents' own deceptive conduct. ' 89
This reasoning, however, eschews the principles underlying the fraud-on-
the-market presumption, which dictate that the fraud-on-the-market
plaintiff relies on the integrity of the market's price instead of having to
rely on the defendant's own deceptive conduct. 190 The Court circum-
vented this reasoning by preemptively stating that the fraud-on-the-
market presumption was inapplicable.191 However, as mentioned, this
should not have been the case. The dissent stated that the majority ap-
plied the wrong standard for causation and used that standard to assert
that the fraud-on-the-market presumption did not apply. 92 Instead, the
dissent argued that the majority should have looked at causation first,
using the correct standard, and it would have found that the fraud-on-the-
market presumption sufficed for the Petitioners to at least plead reli-
ance. 193
This Comment agrees with the dissent's causation and reliance
views but also asserts that a causation analysis for a plaintiff using the
fraud-on-the-market theory should reflect the market's role, and the
Court should have considered this. Notably, the theory of causation ap-
plicable to a plaintiff who must prove actual reliance is not perfectly in-
terchangeable with a plaintiff using the fraud-on-the-market theory to
establish reliance.194 The difference lies in the nature of each plaintiffs
injury and how each defendant's deceptive acts influenced those inju-
nes. 95
Take, for example, a plaintiff bringing a traditional § 10(b) claim
against a defendant who made a misrepresentation during face-to-face
188. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769 (stating that a plaintiff's reliance upon a defendant's
deceptive act is essential because it ensures a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and
the plaintiffs injury).
189. Id. at 770.
190. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 246-47.
191. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769.
192. See id. at 776-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. See id. (noting that traditionally, reliance only requires transactional causation, meaning
that but for the deceptive act, the plaintiff would not have entered into the securities transaction). In
the alternative, the dissent argued that Petitioner had successfully alleged that Respondents' acts
proximately caused Charter's misstatement of income and knew that their acts would enter those
statements and thereafter the market. Id.
194. Compare Basic, 485 U.S. at 244-47 (holding that a plaintiff using the fraud-on-the-market
presumption relies on the market's integrity and is injured when the defendant's public misrepresen-
tation affects that integrity), with Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769 (holding that a plaintiff not pleading a
presumption must prove that he or she directly relied on the defendant's deceptive act). Essentially,
a central theme of this Comment is that the Court required Petitioner to show direct reliance on
Respondents' deceptive acts and that those acts directly caused Petitioner's injury, when it should
have adopted the fraud-on-the-market presumption and allowed Petitioner to rely upon the market.
195. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769.
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negotiations. In this example, the plaintiff must prove actual reliance on
the defendant's misrepresentation and that his or her reliance on that
misrepresentation caused economic loSS. 196 Here, the plaintiff's injury
shares a direct link with the defendant's conduct. There is no middle-
man. In this hypothetical, if the plaintiff relied on the defendant's mis-
representations and that reliance caused the plaintiff's injury, then the
plaintiff has successfully pleaded the reliance and causation elements of
his § 10(b) claim. Because of the direct link between the injury and the
defendant's conduct, attribution of the deceptive conduct to the defen-
dant is necessary to prevent circumventing the reliance and causation
elements. In sum, a plaintiff who must prove actual reliance is unable to
do so absent knowledge of the defendant's identity and deceptive act.
Actual reliance is a test with two parties where one person made a state-
ment and the other directly relied on it.
On the other hand, a plaintiff using the fraud-on-the-market pre-
sumption is pleading an injury that came to fruition by a different
means. 197 Particularly, such a plaintiff is alleging that he or she specifi-
cally did not rely directly on the defendant's misrepresentation.' 98 In-
stead, he or she relied on the integrity of the market and its reflection of
the value of a security as represented by that security's price.' 99 The
market, in this case, performs a valuation function that is not present in a
face-to-face negotiation. 200 Here it is possible for the plaintiff to rely on
the price of a security and suffer an injury when that price is affected by
misinformation as a result of the defendant's deceptive acts without actu-
ally discovering the identity of that defendant or his or her deceptive
acts.20 1 Accordingly, the plaintiff can suffer an economic loss that is
caused by the defendant's deceptive act by virtue of that act infiltrating
the market and affecting the market price and, in turn, the plaintiff s reli-
ance upon that price. 2  Causation, in this instance, should reflect that
the plaintiff relies on the market instead of the deceptive actor. The in-
troduction of the market changes the nature of plaintiff's reliance as well
as how the defendant's conduct causes the plaintiff's injury.20 3 Specifi-
cally, if reliance is designed to ensure a sufficient causal connection be-
tween the plaintiffs injury and the defendant's deceptive act, changing
the nature of that plaintiff s reliance should necessarily change the nature
196. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769 (inferring that if a presumption of reliance is inapplica-
ble, a plaintiff must prove actual reliance upon the defendant's deceptive act and that the defendant's
deceptive act caused plaintiff's injury).
197. Basic, 485 U.S. at 242-49 (noting that a plaintiff proving reliance under the fraud-on-the-
market presumption is injured by virtue of the defendant's deceptive act infiltrating the market with
misinformation that degrades the integrity of the market price upon which the plaintiff is relying).
198. Id. at 241-42.
199. Id. at 245-46.
200. Id. at 244-45.
201. See supra Part I.D.
202. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 246-47.
203. Id. at 243-45.
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of causation. 204 Therefore, in Stoneridge, the Court should have found
that Petitioners relied on the market's integrity, and that Respondents
influenced that market.
The Court declined to follow this reasoning by applying, as aptly
put in the dissent, a "super-causation ',' 2 5 theory that requires attribution
of the deceptive act to the defendant within a public communication.2 6
The Court noted that, allowing anything less than public attribution
207would result in causation that is too remote. However, this really is
not the case. Rather, the causation element has one extra proxy because
of the market's role.208 A causation analysis under the fraud-on-the-
market presumption should reflect that it has an additional actor, the
market, and that the plaintiff relies on the market.20 9 Thus, causation
under the fraud-on-the-market presumption should be a test involving
three parties: the defendant, the market, and the plaintiff. Specifically, if
a defendant's deceptive acts influenced the market, and the plaintiff re-
lied on the integrity of that market, a sufficient causal connection should
exist.210
There is no question that Respondents used or employed (made) a
deceptive act as defined in Central Bank.2t1 In fact, the Court concedes
that Respondents' conduct would be considered a deceptive act under the
language of § 10(b).212 Yet, the Court rests its opinion on the fact that it
was Charter, not Respondents, who reported the false revenue to inves-
tors.213 It is inherently contradictory for the Court to state that on the one
hand, Respondents committed a deceptive act; while on the other hand,
investors could not have relied on that act under the fraud-on-the-market
presumption when the substance of it became public and affected the
market price. The Court failed to see that Respondents' deceptive act
was not just the making of sham contracts; rather, the Respondents were
making sham contracts for the sole purpose of inflating Charter's reve-
nue in a statement they knew would be distributed to the public. When
that revenue was disseminated to the market214 and when its falsities sur-
faced and affected the price of Charter's stock, it is difficult to see how
204. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 (2008).
205. Id. at 774.
206. Id. at 769-70; see also id. at 774-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 769.
208. Basic, 485 U.S. at 243-47.
209. Id.
210. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 776 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that a correct view of
causation coupled with the fraud-on-the-market theory should have allowed Petitioners to plead
reliance).
211. See id. at 769.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 770.
214. Charter, as a publicly-traded company, was required to disclose its revenue to the SEC for
publication. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.301(c)2 (2008). Presumably, Respondents were not ignorant
of this fact.
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the requisite causal connection was not met under the rationale support-
ing the fraud-on-the-market theory.
The Court rested its holding on the notion that the securities indus-
try needs a clear and predictable standard with which to conform.215
Stoneridge provides that standard, but for the wrong reasons.
B. Policy Considerations Underlying Stoneridge
The explanation for the Court's holding in Stoneridge likely comes
from policy considerations. Interested parties filed nearly thirty Amicus
briefs in the case.216 Many of those briefs urged the Court to take the
215. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770-72.
216. Amici Curiae Brief of Charles W. Adams and William Von Glahn in Support of Peti-
tioner, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43),
2007 WL 1701932; Brief for Amici Curiae States of Arkansas et al. in Support of Petitioner, Ston-
eridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL
1701934; Brief for Attorneys' Liab. Assurance Soc'y, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respon-
dents, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43),
2007 WL 2363261; Brief for Bus. Roundtable as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Ston-
eridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL
2363259; Brief for Change to Win and the CtW Inv. Group as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007
WL 1701933; Brief for Former SEC Comm'rs and Officials and Law and Fin. Professors as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S.
Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2329638; Brief for Professors James D. Cox et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S.
Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 1701606; Brief for Richard . Beattie et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761
(2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2363253; Brief for the Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2363263; Brief for the Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc.
and NYSE Euronext as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2958946; Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2329639; Brief of AARP et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S.
Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 1701939; Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Ins. Ass'n and Prop.
Cas. Insurers Ass'n of Am. in Support of Respondents, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scien-
tific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 3068882; Brief of Cal. State Teach-
ers' Ret. Sys. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scien-
tific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 1701937; Brief of Council of Institu-
tional Investors as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scien-
tific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 1701610; Brief of Merrill Lynch &
Co., Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2363254; Brief of Ohio et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 1957413; Brief of Org.
for Int'l Inv. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2363262; Brief of the Am.
Ass'n for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 1701936; Brief of the Am.
Bankers Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2329637; Brief of the Chamber
of Commerce of the U.S. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Stoneridge Inv. Partners,
L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2363260; Brief of the
Def. Research Inst. in Support of Respondents Amicus Curiae for Respondents, Stoneridge Inv.
Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2329636;
Brief of the Los Angeles County Employees Ret. Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioners, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-
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Respondents' position and affirm the circuit court's decision. The Court
picked up on several general concerns permeating the arguments of Re-
spondents' Amici and those arguments are reflected in the Court's hold-
ing.
1. Snowballing Litigation and Keeping Up with the Joneses:
Policy Considerations Important to the Court
Sixteen Amici filed briefs in support of Respondents' position, and,
while each had its own advice for the Court, several themes emerged.
First, Respondents' Amici argued that Petitioners' theory would lead to
an explosion of expensive class-action litigation that would in turn make
U.S. financial markets less competitive with foreign markets that either
do not allow, or significantly limit, class action lawsuits. 2 7  A second
theme alleged that adopting Petitioners' theory would not provide a rule
that was "clear and predictable" enough to be administered in the econ-
omy at large.21 8 Third, Respondents' Amici contended that there are
adequate safeguards and deterrents in place to protect against fraud and
compensate its victims without the need of a private right of action
219against aiders and abettors.
a. Class-Action Lawsuits Make U.S. Markets Uncompetitive
As succinctly put by one of Respondents' Amici:
There is a widely acknowledged perception, backed by empirical
evidence, that a hostile U.S. litigation environment materially in-
43), 2007 WL 1701940; Brief of the Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respon-
dents, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43),
2007 WL 2363258; Brief of the N.Y. State Teachers' Ret. Sys. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-
43), 2007 WL 1701935; Brief of the N. Am. Sec. Adm'rs Ass'n, Inc., as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioner, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No.
06-43), 2007 WL 1701938; Brief of the Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Court-Appointed Lead Plaintiff
in the Enron Sec. Litig., as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C.
v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 1701942; Brief of the Sec.
Indus. and Fin. Mkts. Ass'n and Futures Indus. Ass'n as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007
WL 2363256; Brief of the Wash. Legal Found. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Ston-
eridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL
2363255.
217. See, e.g., Brief for Attorneys' Liab. Assurance Soc'y, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents, supra note 216, at *9; Brief for Former SEC Comm'rs and Officials and Law and Fin.
Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 216, at *14-15; Brief for the Am.
Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 216, at
*21-22; Brief of Org. for Int'l Inv. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 216,
at *11.
218. See, e.g., Brief for Bus. Roundtable as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra
note 216, at *17-18; Brief for Richard I. Beattie et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
supra note 216, at *28; Brief of Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respon-
dents, supra note 216, at 16-19.
219. Brief of the Sec. Indus. and Fin. Mkts. Ass'n and Futures Indus. Ass'n as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, supra note 216, at *21-23; Brief of the Wash. Legal Found. as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 216, at * 12-16.
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creased the costs and risks associated with raising capital in the U.S.
markets. Several recent studies demonstrated that this environment is
a driving force behind the precipitous decline in the U.S. capital mar-
ket activity. 
2 °
This argument asserted that class-action lawsuits greatly increase
the cost of doing business in U.S. markets and this cost is not present in
foreign markets.22 ' The main fuel for this argument came from three
reports concluding that foreign companies feared entering U.S. markets
because of the possibility of class-action lawsuits against them, and that
such fears played an important role in the recent decline in U.S. market
222share. Therefore, allowing § 10(b) liability without public attribution
of a misrepresentation to a defendant would lead to a huge increase in the
amount of class-action lawsuits resulting in further erosion of U.S. mar-
ket share.223 In short, the chilling effect would get colder, encouraging
"[f]light to [f]oreign [e]quity [m]arkets, [w]hich [o]ffer [i]ncreasingly
,,224[c]ompetitive [a]ltematives.
b. Petitioner's Theory is Not "Clear and Predictable"
Another theme surfaced among Respondents' Amici alleging that if
§ 10(b) liability was extended to persons who engaged in conduct with
the purpose and effect of creating fraud, business transactions would
effectively be created on an "ad hoc" basis without the guidance of a
clear and predictable rule.225 This would come as a disadvantage to an
area that demands predictability.226 Importantly, Amici argued that the
purpose and effect (the liability theory advanced by Petitioner) of a busi-
ness transaction is completely subjective, so that persons engaged in le-
gitimate transactions have no clear way of guarding against liability.
227
That is, discerning the purpose and effect of a particular transaction in-
volves a subjective analysis that is of little predictive value. Indeed,
Amici feared that conduct that was legitimate during the transaction
220. Brief of Org. for Int'l Inv. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note
216, at *11.
221. See, e.g., id.
222. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, COMMISSION ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL
MARKETS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 30 (2007), available at
http://www.uschamber.com/publications/reports/O703capmarketscomm.htm; MICHAEL R.
BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK'S AND THE US' GLOBAL
FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 78 (2007), available at http://www.schumer.senate.gov
/SchumerWebsite/pressroonmspecial..reports/2007/NYREPORT%20_FINAL.pdf; COMM. ON
CAPITAL MKTS., INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 34
(2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30 CommitteeInterimReportREV2.pdf.
223. See Brief of Org. for Int'l Inv. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra
note 216, at *14-15.
224. Brief for the Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc. & NYSE Euronext as Arnici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, supra note 216, at * 12-15.
225. See, e.g., Brief of the Am. Bankers Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respon-





could later be artfully pleaded to appear as being entered into with the
purpose and effect of creating fraud. As stated: "[T]his Court should not
create an amorphous and subjective theory of potentially catastrophic
liability that would impede the important functions of banks and other
financial institutions in providing the financial fuel that drives our Na-
tion's economy. 228 In sum, the parties to business transactions need to
know what they can and cannot do in order to avoid § 10(b) liability.
c. Adequate Remedies Already Exist, and Those Remedies
Deter Fraud
A third theme advanced by Respondents' Amici argued that ade-
quate remedies are already in place to guard against aiding and abetting
without the need for creating a private right of action.229 Indeed, Amici
asserted that aiders and abettors already face significant deterrents under
the current rule of law. 230  For example, the SEC can bring actions
against aiders and abettors and return ill-gotten profits to injured inves-
tors.23' In fact, Amici reminded the Court that the SEC returned many
billions of dollars to investors between 2002 and 2006.232 Moreover, the
Department of Justice is able to bring criminal charges against aiders and
23abettors.  One Amici alleged that criminal prosecution for aiding and
abetting had the possibility to not only stigmatize a violator's business
prospects, but effectively bankrupt the company.234 The Securities In-
dustry and Financial Markets Association argued that criminal penalties
have the potential to end a career or shut down a company. 235 Lastly,
Amici alleged that state law remedies are also in place to guard against
fraud.236
2. The Court Adopts the Views of Respondents' Amici
Even a cursory review of Stoneridge reveals that the views of Re-
spondents' Amici struck a note with the Court. Indeed, the concerns of
Respondents' Amici are peppered throughout the Court's opinion, with
an entire section devoted to those concerns.237 The Court touched upon
how, if the Petitioner's theory was accepted, "the implied cause of action
would reach the whole marketplace in which the issuing company does
business. 238 Moreover, the Court noted that Petitioners sought to apply
228. Id. at *14.
229. See, e.g., Brief of Former SEC Comm'rs & Officials & Law & Fin. Professors as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 216, at * 18-19.




234. Brief of the Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass'n & Futures Ind. Ass'n as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, supra note 216, at *22-24.
235. Id.
236. Id. at *28.
237. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761,772-74 (2008).
238. Id. at 764.
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§ 10(b) "beyond the securities markets into [the realm of financing busi-
ness-to-purchase and supply contracts] the realm of ordinary business
operations ... [The latter realm is governed], for the most part, by state
law." '239 Additionally, the Court noted that "[s]econdary actors are sub-
ject to criminal penalties and civil enforcement by the SEC," and that
"both parties agree that criminal penalties are a strong deterrent. 2 40 Peti-
tioners' Amici refuted some of Respondents' Amici's arguments; how-
ever, none of those arguments appear in the Court's opinion.
3. A Response: Policy Considerations the Court Should Have
Noticed
The Court's Stoneridge opinion makes it clear that only deceptive
acts either (1) communicated to the public by the actor, or (2) identified
to the public at the time a security is bought or sold will face liability
under § 10(b).24 1 Unfortunately, the rule is equally clear to persons seek-
ing to defraud the market: make sure your name stays out of public re-
leases and let someone else do the talking. Fraud in the market is not
likely to stop and defrauders are consistently coming up with new ways
242to cheat investors. To such persons, Stoneridge poses no obstacle.
In support for its "clear and predicable" rule, the Court reasons that
uncertainty and the increased cost of business under any other rule would
not only hinder existing businesses, but deter foreign corporations from
entering the American market. 243 Yet, the sanctity of our securities mar-
kets does not balance upon either premise. Instead, a single factor binds
the market: investor confidence. 244 Simply put, if investors do not be-
lieve that the markets are secure, they will invest their money elsewhere.
This confidence is derived from investor perception of market integ-
rity.245 Surely, investors both local and foreign are attracted to the U.S.
securities markets because they are the largest and safest in the world.246
These accolades are not mutually exclusive. To be sure, the U.S. mar-
kets are the largest because they are the safest.
247
239. Id.
240. Id. at 773.
241. Id. at 769.
242. See Taylor, supra note 1, at 389.
243. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 772.
244. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244-47 (1988); see also Taylor, supra note 1, at
388.
245. See Basic, Inc., 485 U.S. at 24447 (1988); see also Taylor, supra note 1, at 388.
246. See Cheryl Nichols, H.R. 2179, The Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution
Act of 2004: A Testament to Selective Federal Preemption, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 533,
537-38 (2008) (explaining that U.S. securities markets are the largest in the world due in part to
investor confidence secondary to regulatory framework); see also W. Carson McLean, The Sar-
banes-Oxley Act: A Detriment to Market Globalization & International Securities Regulation, 33
SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & COM. 319, 324-25 (2005) (noting that U.S. securities markets are the larg-
est in the world).
247. See Nichols, supra note 246, at 53940.
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Concededly, foreign investors and institutions may be somewhat de-
terred by an increase in the cost of business or capital. However, the
financial uncompetitiveness of U.S. markets as envisioned by Respon-
dents' Amici is not solely a result of an increased cost of business secon-
dary to an increase in the amount of class-action litigation.248 In fact, at
least one commentator has opined that fear of class actions is but a small
facet in the decline of U.S. competiveness in the financial services indus-
try.249 For example, the initial fee for being listed on the NASDAQ
(which, ironically, filed an Amicus brief arguing that class-action litiga-
tion is to blame for the decrease in U.S. competitiveness) is approxi-
mately $100,000 with a subsequent yearly fee of between $25,000 and
$75,000 to maintain the listing. 50 Comparatively, the cost for listing on
competitor foreign markets was approximately $7,500 for an initial fee
and the same amount yearly to maintain the listing.25  The fact that list-
ing fees on the NASDAQ are approximately ten times as dear surely
undermines the competitiveness of U.S. financial services, along with a
myriad of other social and economic factors.252
Instead, entering a market is likely a balancing of several pros and
cons for any foreign entity. This Comment proposes that such entities do
not enter a market solely because it is has the lowest cost of business. If
this were true, the U.S. markets would likely be a lot less populated.
Rather, entities both local and foreign enter the U.S. markets because of
the enormous amount of investors trading and the amount of capital such
investors make available for funding new opportunities. 53 However, this
market rests on a foundation based upon its integrity, and each chip the
Court takes out of that foundation brings the house closer to tumbling
down. Congress recognized this when it enacted the 1934 Act. The
Court recognized this when it created the fraud-on-the-market presump-
tion. Unfortunately, Stoneridge marches to the beat of a different drum-
mer.
Primarily, the Court's unwavering reliance on Central Bank was
misplaced. The conduct of the defendants in Central Bank was consid-
erably more benign than that of Respondents in Stoneridge 4 In Central
248. See Elizabeth F. Brown, The Tyranny of the Multitude is a Multiplied Tyranny: Is the
United States Financial Regulatory Structure Undermining U.S. Competitiveness?, 2 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 369, 376 (2008) (suggesting that, in addition to an increase in class action
litigation, expanding the number of regulatory agencies decreases competiveness).
249. See id. at 390.
250. Id. at 400.
251. Id.
252. See id. at 376.
253. See McLean, supra note 246, at 324-25 (suggesting that U.S. securities markets have the
largest amounts of investors and capital available for investment and these attributes make it attrac-
tive to foreign companies).
254. Compare Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 167-68
(1994) (noting that respondent's conduct was delaying a land reassessment until after a bond issue),
with Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 128 S. Ct. 761, 766-67 (2008) (ex-
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Bank, the defendants merely postponed a land reassessment until a bond
issue was complete. 5  In fact, the Central Bank Court concluded that
such actions did not amount to a deceptive act within the meaning of §
10(b).256 However, in Stoneridge, Respondents not only agreed to en-
gage in a fraudulent scheme, they actively participated by drafting, back-
dating, and then signing contracts with the sole purpose of defrauding the
market.257 The Court concluded that such actions amounted to "making"
a deceptive act as defined in Central Bank.258 In light of this significant
factual difference, the Court should have used caution in relying so heav-
ily on Central Bank's precepts.
The dissent implied that since Respondents "made" a deceptive act
they should have been considered primary actors under the strictures of
Central Bank.25 9 Applying this reasoning, the Court was not even pre-
sented with the issue of aiding and abetting, and, accordingly, its reliance
upon the precedent and policy considerations applicable to aiding and
abetting are inapposite to the factual scenario presented by the Ston-
eridge Respondents' conduct. As a result of this interpretation, plaintiffs
will seize upon the dissent's reasoning and lower courts will likely con-
tinue to develop confusing law as to what conduct amounts to primary
liability and what is merely aiding and abetting.
Likewise, the Court's rationale that adequate remedies and deter-
rents are in place falls short of the mark. Specifically, the Court states
that the SEC's enforcement is not "toothless," having collected more
than $10 billion in disgorgement since 2002.260 Recently, however, the
SEC has pleaded for additional help in the form of a private right of ac-
tion.26' While the SEC's efforts may not be entirely toothless, the SEC is
an agency of limited resources. 262 In the words of several former SEC
commissioners who submitted an Amicus brief in support of Petitioners:
The SEC's disgorgement and civil money penalty powers, although
enhanced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, are limited, and will generally
cover only a fraction of the damage done to investors by serious se-
curities fraud. "Moreover, the SEC with limited resources cannot
plaining that Respondents drafted false contracts and correspondence and backdated those docu-
ments to engage in a circular transaction to artificially boost Charter's revenue).
255. Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 167-68.
256. See id. at 177-78.
257. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 767.
258. Id. at 769.
259. Id. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
260. Id. at 773.
261. See, e.g., Simpson v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006).
262. See Taylor, supra note 1, at 385.
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possibly undertake to bring actions in every one or even most of the
financial fraud cases that have proliferated of the past few years."
263
The same Amicus proffered that, while the SEC has disgorgement
authority, its efforts are not as effective as a private right of action in
compensating the victims of fraud.264 For example, the SEC was only
able to disgorge and return approximately $440 million of the nearly $40
billion of claimed losses as a result of Enron.265 So, while the SEC's
authority may not be "toothless," it certainly does not have the bite the
Court suggested. At the end of the day, the Court may not be required to
defer to the SEC's judgment, however, that does not mean it should ig-
nore it completely.
Perhaps most misguided of all are the Court's continuing efforts to
guarantee a "clear and predictable" rule for the business world. In creat-
ing such a rule, the Court in Stoneridge gives businesses engaging in
shady transactions a shield, when the legislative intent behind § 10(b)
mandates that it should be giving plaintiffs injured by those transactions
a sword.
Respondents (and their Amici) asserted that they did not break any
laws and that the contracts they entered into with Charter were com-
266pletely legitimate. However, when Charter approached Respondents
with the revenue-inflating deal, Respondents had to make a decision of
whether to participate. On the one hand, Respondents and their numer-
ous counsel presumably knew the current state of the law regarding §
10(b) liability. Indeed, the law was clear and predictable. As the law
then existed, Respondents knew that if they did not speak to the public or
have a duty to speak they could not be found liable in a private suit for
engaging in the sham transactions.267
On the other hand, however, Respondents also certainly knew that
their dealings with Charter had no economic value and did not serve any
decent economic purpose. While those transactions may have been "le-
gitimate" according to the law as it then existed, they definitely did not
serve a legitimate purpose.
263. Motion for Leave to File Brief Out of Time & Brief Amici Curiae of Former SEC
Comm'rs in Support of Petitioner, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S.
Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2065260, at *8.
264. Id. at 7-8.
265. Id. at 8.
266. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 767 (2008)
(stating that Respondents booked the sham "transactions as a wash, under generally accepted ac-
counting principles"); see, e.g., Brief of the Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents, supra note 216, at *15 (noting that under the rule applied by the Eighth Circuit an
entity can only be held liable for violating § 10(b) it makes an affirmative misrepresentation or omits
facts it had a duty to disclose).
267. See Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 180 (refusing to consider reliance to be met when
one does not make a misstatement or omission when there is a duty to disclose).
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The question then becomes, what sort of predictable rule most accu-
rately reflects Congress's intent as reflected in §10(b)? As one Senate
report noted, § 10(b) is designed to prohibit "those manipulative and de-
ceptive practices which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful func-
,,268 Cuthsttion. The Court has departed from the legislative intent it purports to
follow by creating a clear and predictable rule that fosters and protects
shady business transactions negatively affecting the securities markets.
Instead, the Court should seek to create a rule of law that attempts to
mend the gap between what is ethical and what is "legitimate."
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Stoneridge is a win for per-
sons engaging in fraud in the securities markets. The Court incorrectly
determined that fraud-on-the-market theory did not apply and foreclosed
Petitioners from asserting that they relied on the integrity of the market
instead of on Respondents ' deceptive acts. The Court should have con-
sidered how expanding the scope of conduct encompassed by the term
"deceptive act" would affect the applicability of the fraud-on-the-market
presumption of reliance. This, along with a correct view of causation,
would have allowed Petitioners to at least plead that Respondents' decep-
tive acts caused their injuries.
The Court should have noticed that, as in this case, a misrepresenta-
tion communicated directly to the public by the defendant has the same
result in the market as a deceptive act committed in secrecy and later
disseminated to the public. In both instances the market price is affected.
Since all investors are presumed to rely on the price of a security269 when
making a trading decision, it should not matter whether that price was
influenced by a direct public misrepresentation or a deception that be-
came public at a later date. As the results are the same, the fraud-on-the-
market presumption of reliance should be available under either scenario,
not just for direct public misrepresentations.
Further, the chain of causation for a plaintiff applying the fraud-on-
the-market presumption should no longer be compared to a standard of
actual reliance. The Court should recognize that the market is an addi-
tional actor in the chain of causation for plaintiffs using the fraud-on-the-
market presumption. As in this case, if the defendant committed a de-
ceptive act, and the substance of that act reached the market, and the
plaintiff was relying on the integrity of that market, a sufficient causal
nexus should exist.
Instead, it appears that the Court's decision was based largely upon
pro-business policy considerations proffered by Respondents and their
268. FLETCHER, FEDERAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 6
(1934).
269. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988).
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Amici. These considerations, however, are lack-luster. The competitive
edge of U.S. securities markets is influenced by a myriad of social and
economic factors other than just its cost of doing business. In fact, the
most significant competitive advantage of our securities markets is that
their size enables an enormous amount of capital to fund the businesses
that need it. However, the size of our markets is secondary to their
safety. Simply put, more money is available in U.S. securities markets
because investors feel comfortable leaving it there. The Court's decision
in Stoneridge should cause those investors to question the depth of that
safety.
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